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According to the mutual forbearance hypothesis, firms tend 
to be less competitive when they have more markets in common. By 
using the awareness motivation capability perspective, this study 
examines how organization’s awareness and motivation can affect 
its decision to use the mutual forbearance strategy. We 
hypothesized how media coverage, alliance experience, and type of 
the alliance moderate the impact of mutual forbearance. We tested 
those hypotheses with a sample of 10 automobile companies in the 
U.S.  
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
In strategic management literature, competitive dynamics 
examines firms placed multimarket competition in order to 
understand the rivalry-deterrence. According to the mutual 
forbearance hypothesis (Edwards, 1955), because firms know the 
high possibility of counterattack by rivals, firms are less likely to be 
competitive when they are competing in multiple common markets. 
Existing studies have supported this hypothesis. For example, 
Karnani and Wernerfelt (1985) conducted multiple case studies of 
rivalry deterrence of firms that compete in multiple markets. Baum 
and Korn (1996) found that as a market domain of each firm 
overlaps, the rate of market entry and exit becomes lower in the 
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airline industry.  
Nevertheless, emphasis of existing studies on conditions 
when mutual forbearance occurs lead to neglect the reason why 
firms drive to compete in multifaceted markets even though they 
have similar capacity (Yu, Subramaniam, and Cannela, 2009). In the 
vein, we concentrate on the behavioral drivers of the organization. 
By adopting the awareness motivational capability (AMC) 
perspective (Chen, 1996; Ma, 1998; Young, Smith, Grimm and 
Simon, 2000), this study tries to find the antecedents that may 
affect the decision making process of mutual forbearance strategy. 
Specifically, we examine the media coverage of a firm’s 
awareness and the experience and type of alliance of its motivation. 
To capture the competitive action of firms we count the number of 




Chapter 2. Theory and Hypotheses 
 
2.1.Mutual Forbearance  
 
When firms compete, they not only consider what strategic 
choices they have but also consider how their rivals will react to 
such strategic decision. This is why firms behave differently to 
rivals that compete in various markets and to those that only 
compete in a single market. In a situation a firm is competing with 
its rival in multiple markets simultaneously, the rival have more 
influence on the focal firm’s strategic decision. Especially when 
the focal firm tries to decide whether or not to initiate a competitive 
action, the presence of multi-market competing rival will have a 
huge impact.  
If we compare the reaction of the rival, when two firms are 
competing in a single market, the rival does not have many options; 
it can either do nothing or counter the attack in the given market. 
But when two firms are competing in multiple markets the rival has 
many options; it can counter in the market where it was attacked or 
in worst case scenario the rival firm might initiate a massive 
counter attack from all of the competing markets, resulting in a total 
war between them. This is why the rivalry between firms that 
compete in a multi-market tends to decrease. Mutual forbearance 
hypothesis suggests that the more contacts across multiple markets 
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a firm has, the greater its incentive to reduce its aggressive 
behavior in those markets (Edwards, 1955).  
Still there are cases of firms that have multimarket contact 
present intense rivalry. For example, two global tire companies in 
the 1970s, Goodyear and Michelin, were competing against each 
other in many markets including North America and Europe. At the 
time, Goodyear was the number one tire manufacturing company in 
the world and Michelin was the third largest. Unlike Goodyear, 
which was mainly operating in the North America, Michelin 
dominated the tire market in Europe. In 1969, Michelin decided to 
increase its presence in North America by constructing a 
manufacturing plant in Canada. For Goodyear, this was interpreted 
as a challenge against them. Goodyear retaliated by attacking the 
European market, which were Michelin’s main market. According 
to the mutual forbearance hypothesis it can be predicted that each 
firm will reduce their competitive move to its competitor, but 
Michelin decided to increase the market share in the North America. 
In the end, the continued competitive action between two firms 
resulted in a total war between them (Karnani and Wernerfelt, 
1985). 
In a situation which forbearing can be a much more viable 
option, why would firms risk going into a total war? According to 
Golden and Ma (2003) firms might have trouble implementing the 
mutual forbearance strategy when there are not enough rewards for 
business units to cooperate and implement the strategy. Because 
each business unit has different goals, when there are not enough 
benefits to cooperate, business unit managers will not give up 
market share or returns for the greater good of the corporation.  
 
2.2 AMC perspective 
 
The AMC perspective has helped us understand the 
antecedents of firms’ decision to initiate competitive actions 
(Chen, 1996; Chen, Su, and Tsai, 2007; Livengood and Regar, 2010; 
Yu and Cannella, 2007). But there are not enough studies that focus 
on the antecedents of mutual forbearance strategy. In what scenario 
are firms more likely to choose tacit collusion? We believe the AMC 
perspective can help us understand the logic behind the firm’s 
decision-making process.  
According to Chen (1996) there are mainly three drivers of 
competitive behavior, which are awareness, motivation, and 
capability. Awareness is focused on the cognitive aspects of the 
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organization, how well they perceive its rivals or actions. The more 
they are aware of its rivals the more likely to initiate an action. The 
motivation represents the variables that will affect the 
psychological side of the organization to initiate an attack. The more 
motivation they will have the more likely the firm will initiate a 
competitive action. Capability represents the ability of the focal firm 
to implement a competitive action. When the focal firm does not 
have enough resource or capability to initiate an attack, they are 
less likely to engage. 
Chen et al. (2007) use the AMC perspective to analyze 
antecedents of perceived competitive tension, each awareness, 
motivation, and capability were repressed by the size, rival’s 
attack volume, and rival’s capability to contest. First the scale of 
the rival will affect the perception of the organization because 
bigger firms are more recognizable than small firms, leading to 
greater perceived tension. Secondly the rival’s attack volume will 
affect the motivation of the organization. As the attack volume is 
bigger they will be more motivated to initiate an attack and greater 
competitive tension against their competitor. And finally the rival’s 
capability to contest will affect the competitive tension. As the rival 
has more capability to contest, such as similarity of the resource to 
the focal firm or the amount of control the rival has to the essential 
resource, the most competitive tension between two firms.  
In this study, awareness is identified by the media coverage 
of both firms, which we believe will enhance the perception of the 
competitive rivalry between two firms. Motivation is signaled by 
two variables; alliance experience and the type of alliance, which 
will affect the motivational side of the firm, lastly the capability will 
be controlled by the resource of each firm. 
 
2.3. Multimarket contact 
 
In the strategic management literature many empirical 
studies support the mutual forbearance hypothesis. Gimeno and 
Woo (1994) have found that firms with more multimarket contacts 
tend to be conservative for each other, resulting in lower rivalry, 
which is reflected by relatively higher prices. Baum and Korn (1996) 
found that the increase in multimarket contact reduces rival's rate 
of entry into each other's markets, thus minimizing aggressive 
competitive invasion. Also Yu, Subramaniam, and Cannela (2009) 
state that in a given country, the greater the multimarket contact 
between and multinational corporation (MNC) and its rival, the 
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lesser the competitive aggressiveness of the MNC’s subsidiary in 
that country.  
 
Hypothesis 1: As firms have more multimarket contact 
between them, the likelihood of launching competitive actions 
will be lower.  
 
2.4 Awareness: Media coverage 
 
Media plays a significant role in shaping the strategy of the 
firm. First media can indirectly affect firms by creating celebrity 
firms. The media not only covers objective information but 
sometimes, in order to capture the views of people, they dramatize 
reality (Zillmann & Bryant, 2002). When they report about firms 
they want something interesting, this is why they try to find firms 
that are different from others, firms that have unique 
characteristics or distinctive identities. This process creates the 
firm celebrity, which can be a valuable resource for creating a 
positive image of the firm. Thus a firm can enjoy its celebrity as an 
intangible asset (Rindova, Pollock, and Hayward, 2014). Second, 
media can directly affect firms. For example, in 1988, footage of a 
fishing boat that was killing hundreds of dolphins while catching 
tuna was broadcasted through US television. This shocking image 
had made many schools and restaurants boycott tuna, erasing them 
from their menu. This boycott was continued until the major tuna 
companies announced that they would only sell dolphin-safe tuna: 
tunas that have been caught in a way that does not harm the 
dolphins (Reinhrdt and Vietor, 1994; Bednar, Boivie and Prince, 
2013). 
The media will affect the strategy of firms by affecting the 
awareness of firms about their rivals. It is more likely for a firm to 
be aware of the competitive situation with its rival that is covered 
by the media every day, than that with a rival that is hardly covered. 
If a firm is not aware of its rival, the firm might not consider its 
rival’s reaction in the decision-making process, unintentionally 
initiating an action that would provoke its rival. On the other hand, if 
a firm is much aware of its rival they will definitely consider the 
rival’s reaction in the decision-making process. As it is easier to 
avoid a threat that is highly visible, firms will be less likely to 
overlook its rival. Also when the media reports the rivalry they will 
make it more dramatic and interesting to capture the audience, 
making the competitive tension more critical than reality (Entman, 
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1989). Thus a firm will be more likely to use mutual forbearance 
strategy to rivals, whose competition is well covered by the media 
than those that are not.  
 
Hypothesis2: As firms have more media coverage between 
them, the impact of mutual forbearance will be stronger.  
 
2.5 Motivation: Alliance experience 
 
Relationship with a competitor can be shaped in various 
ways. Two firms can be just competitors, competing each other 
without any other transactions, or two firms can cooperate and 
compete simultaneously. The strategic alliance between 
competitors can help each other in various areas such as product 
development, production, new investment, and marketing (Bengston 
and Kock, 2000; David and Slocom, 1992). Firms can even learn 
new technologies or capabilities from their alliance partners (Hamel 
1991). Through strategic alliance with their competitors, firms 
compete and cooperate at the same time. For example, in the 
Swedish lining industry, Skega Ltd. and Trellex Ltd. are heavy 
competitors, fighting for every single customer, lowering their 
prices to take away each other’s customer. But at the same time 
they are cooperators when they develop new technologies. Both 
firms use each other’s laboratories to run projects, increase the 
efficiency of the R&D and utilize each other’s competence 
(Bengston and Kock, 2000). Also in the automotive industry, Mazda 
and Ford compete in various markets from pickup trucks to small 
cars. But on the same time both companies have a co-production 
plant in Thailand called AutoAlliance, which was established in 1995. 
The shared production and supplies lead to lower cost and 
efficiency. Both companies also collaborate in new product 
development and learn each other’s expertise. For example, 
Mazda has provided Ford with a critical engineering technology for 
small cars (Automotive News, 2003). 
In considering strategic alliance partners, firms choose 
repeated alliance partner because transaction cost can be also 
lowered from the mutual trust. In alliance formation process 
developing contract is time-consuming and expensive. If the 
partners are new to each other and do not understand well enough 
to trust each other, they will have to write a detailed contract that 
prevents the other party from acting opportunistically. But for firms 
that have experienced each other and formed a mutual trust, the 
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detailed contract is unnecessary. The familiarity and trust make the 
process of doing business together less costly. Also implementing 
joint operation will be easier because they know each other’s 
strategic processes systems and routines and know by experience 
what their partner is capable of and not capable of (Zollo, Reuer and 
Singh, 2002). The mutual trust between two firms will reduce the 
transaction cost, as it will also lower the monitoring cost. Parkhe 
(1993) found that the presence of prior experience of collaboration 
between two firms lowered their observation for opportunistic 
behavior and as a result lowering the level of safeguards in their 
contracts.  
These advantages in prior alliance experience such as less 
uncertainty and lowered transaction cost from a mutual trust will 
give reason for firms to consider those firms with alliance 
experience a promising future alliance partner. When two firms that 
have multiple markets in common enter a total war, their possibility 
of becoming future alliance partner will be slim. Thus firms will 
have more motives to consider tacit collusion with their rivals, who 
they consider as alliance partner. Also, when two firms have 
alliance experience, mutual trust will form, and when there is trust 
between firms, emotion enters into the relationship. As people who 
have become friends will often try to avoid conflicts (McAllister, 
1995), the focal firm will be motivated to use mutual forbearance 
strategy, reluctant to initiate a competitive action to their 
competitor, which the focal firm considers it a friend not a foe. 
 
Hypothesis3: As firms have more alliance experience with 
each other, the impact of mutual forbearance will be stronger.  
 
2.6. Motivation: Alliance type 
 
Not only the volume of alliance experience but also the type 
of alliance will affect the motivation of the firm in deciding to 
implement a mutual forbearance strategy. Horizontal alliance can be 
categorized into scale alliance and link alliance, according to the 
difference in the contribution of each firm. In scale alliance firms 
contribute similar resource that are in the same stages in the value 
chain, enjoying economies of scale, whereas in link alliance firms 
contribute different resources and capabilities at the different stage 
of the value chain (Dussage, Garrette and Mitchell, 2000; Hennart, 
1988). In 2012 BMW and Toyota teamed up to research on new 
generation batteries for greener vehicles. Both firms contributed in 
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the same value chain to develop the new technology, which will 
increase the performance and capacity of lithium ion batteries. This 
alliance is an example of scale alliance. Dussage et al. (2000) found 
that there is more change in outcome to firms that experienced link 
alliance than scale alliance; there were more reorganization and 
takeovers between firms in link alliance than in scale alliance. 
Whereas firms in scale alliance tend to continue without any change 
for a longer duration. This means that competitors with link alliance 
will have different competitive behavior than scale alliance.  
On the other hand, in scale alliance such as the joint R&D 
between BMW and Toyota, they are trying to develop a new 
technology together, which results in more opportunities for joint 
learning than inter-firm learning. Because they learn more doing 
together than from each other, they will enjoy more common 
benefits than private benefits. This will make firms be more 
cooperative than competitive. And in turn this will give another 
motive to the firm “not” to initiated competitive actions. In link 
alliance when one of the firm considers that there are no more skills 
to learn from its partner the firm will have no more reason to 
continue the alliance relationship, but in scale alliance firms learn 
together and use each other resource to enjoy economies of scale, 
making both firms to consider them as a prominent future alliance 
partner even when their alliance has been terminated.  
Another difference between link alliance and scale alliance is 
that often the motive of a partner of link alliance is to gain footholds 
in the other firms markets or business areas. Because firms in link 
alliance mostly learn new skills and capabilities from its partner 
firm, they can use that skills and capabilities to gain a foothold in 
other’s markets. For example in the case of NUMMI (New United 
Motor Manufacturing, Inc.) joint venture, Toyota gained knowledge 
of the automotive industry in United States and successfully 
expanded its market share. Thus, firms that have experienced link 
alliance will be less likely to choose mutual forbearance strategy on 
the other hand firms that have experienced scale alliance will have 
more motive to initiate mutual forbearance strategy.  
 
Hypothesis 4: The impact of mutual forbearance will be 
stronger between firms that experienced scale alliance with 
each other than between firms that experienced link alliance. 
 




3.1. Research Design 
 
In order to test the hypotheses, we have investigated 10 
largest global automobile manufacturers in U.S. between 2006 and 
2008 inclusive. The firms are BMW, Ford, General Motors, Honda, 
Hyundai, Nissan, Mazda, Subaru, Toyota, and Volkswagen. Daimler 
and Chrysler, which are also a major competitor in the United 
States, was excluded from the list because the two companies had 
been a single company DaimlerChrysler until 2007, a fact that 
makes it impossible to observe the effect of alliance experience. 
Also, Fiat was excluded because of missing data. We choose the 
automobile market because it was easy to identify each market 
segments from oligopolistic competitors; each company competes in 
more than one market and has its significant market. For example, 
BMW has its competitive edge in luxury cars and for Hyundai and 
Honda, mid-sized car is their strong point.  
To analyze competitive actions we used structured content 
analysis, which is widely used in competitive dynamics studies 
(Chen and Hambrick, 1995; Ferrier, 2001; Yu et al., 2009). We use 
the keywords that Yu et al. (2009) had used for identifying the 
competitive action. The keywords include words such as “attack”, 
“contest” and “rival”. We searched for every article from 2006 
to 2008 in the Automotive News website. We have selected 
Automotive News because it specialize in only the auto industry and 
provides more detailed and an extensive news article about the 
automobile industry and the actions of automobile companies. Other 
sources such as AutoWeek, Automotive Industries, and Business 




Competitive action: we counted all of the competitive action 
that a firm has initiated. When Automotive News reports an action, 
the article typically states the firm that initiated the action and the 
rival firm that received that action. Because the mutual forbearance 
only examines the dyad of firms we did not count those actions 
involves more than 3 firms. 
 
Multimarket contact: Baum and Korn (1999) measured 
multimarket contact by counting the total number of markets in 
common is not sufficient. If we want to capture the potential mutual 
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forbearance between firms, it is important to consider the relative 
importance of the contact, for example a firm that compete with its 
competitor in 5 markets of its own 6 markets is more likely to 
consider the contact important than a firm that competes with the 
same competitor in 6 market of its 20 markets. But the simple 
counting measure will imply that the first multimarket contact is 
less than the second.  
Simple counting measure does not consider the difference in 
significance of each market. It is important to differentiate the 
market, which the firm considers valuable, and those markets, 
which the firm do not consider as valuable. Baum and Korn (1999) 
used the concept of centrality, which is defined as the proportion of 
airline’s routes that connect with the route in concern (Borenstein, 
1989). However, because this study is examining the automobile 
industry, it is impossible to use the same definition of centrality. 
Instead of airline’s routes, we calculated the proportion of 
products that are positioned in a given market. With these 
conditions we use the following measure to capture multimarket 
contact between firm i and j at a time t : 
 
Multimarket contactijt= 
∑ [    × (    ×     )] + ∑ [    × (    ×     )] 	   	  
   +   
 
For all j, ∑ (    ×     ) >    
 
In the measure m denotes the market served by firm i and j, 
C is the centralities of the product in market m, and D is the 
indicator variable which is set as 1 when i and j are in the market m 
at time t, and zero if they are not in the market. For two firms that 
meet in only one market or less, the multimarket contact between 
them is zero. We calculated multimarket contact on a yearly basis 
for each firm using the information from Automotive News Data 
Center. The Market classification data set is updated every year 
and lists all the products of 10 automotive companies arranged by 
their market. 
 
Media coverage: To code the media coverage of firms, we 
searched for every article that contains both of the names of two 
companies from Automotive News. Then, in order to reduce the 
causality issue, we have lagged the time by one year. If the article 
mentions more than 4 companies or is not mainly about two 
companies we exclude them. We then simply counted the number of 
 
 12
articles in each year.  
 
Alliance experience: Because the alliance experience 
regarded as a motive for the firm not to initiate competitive action, 
it is inappropriate to count all of the number of alliance from the 
year. Also simply counting the number of an alliance is not 
sufficient because some alliances tend to last longer than others, 
thus each alliance will have a different effect on firms (Rothaemel 
and Deeds, 2006). So we choose to count the years of alliance in a 
5-year window. For example, if a firm had two different alliances 
with its partner, one from 2002 to 2003 and the other from 2002 to 
2006, the coding of 2006 alliance experience is 7. We collected my 
data from Guide to Global Automotive Partnerships, which 
Automotive News provides a yearly base. We included all of the 
alliance from link alliance to scale alliance.  
 
Alliance type: The alliance type was collected from Guide to 
Global Automotive Partnerships from Automotive News. This 
yearly updated data gives data about the automotive partnership 
with more than 18 firms. The partnership is categorized into the 
joint venture, assembly alliance, and technical/parts alliance. We 
first coded assembly alliance as link alliance and technical/parts 
alliance as scale alliance, than in order to find out whether the joint 
venture is link or scale we have searched for relative articles 
relating the specific content of the alliance. Both link and scale 
alliance was coded as same as the alliance experience, they were 
coded by the years when the alliance is established.  
 
Control variables: To rule out other explanations, we 
controlled for several firm-level characteristics. First prior studies 
have found that firm’s scope can influence the number of 
competitive action. Firms that have larger scope have greater 
resource thus they are more likely to engage competitive action 
than smaller firms. The firm scope was measured as the number of 
markets that each firm is competing in. Slack resource might be a 
significant influence in competitive action, so we measured current 
assets/current liabilities to control for organizational slack 
(Hambrick, Cho and Chen, 1996). Also, the profitability of firms can 
also affect the competitive action of firms the more profitable the 
firm is the more competitive action they can initiate. The 
profitability was measured as the last year’s total revenue. We 






The unit of analysis in this study is the dyad of automobile 
firms by year. The sample contains 10 automobiles from 2006 to 
2008, thus the data set contains 270 observations (10 × 9 × 3). 
Because the sample was collected repeatedly over 3 years, this 
violates the assumption of observation independence, and this might 
result in autocorrelation. In order to reduce the danger of 
autocorrelation, we used generalized least squares (GLS) approach 
rather than ordinary least squares (OLS). When using panel data, 
GLS can be used to estimating statistics even when autocorrelation 
and heteroskedasticity are present. For robustness check, we ran a 
Paris-Wisten regression with standard errors, and also we ran OLS 
regression with robust standard errors. They showed similar 
results.  
 
Chapter 4. Results 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics and correlations (N=270) 
Variables Mea
n 
s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1.Firm scope (number of 
markets) 






      
3.Total revenueb 6.24 1.06 0.10 0.35      
4.Multimarket contact 4.62 2.02 0.42 -
0.08 
0.19     




0.08    




0.14 0.07   
7.Link alliance 0.26 0.78 0.24 -
0.09 
0.00 0.20 0.01 0.71  
8.Scale alliance 0.29 0.76 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.11 0.68 0.41 
 
Table 1 gives the means, standard deviations, and correlations for 
the variables from this study. We used OLS to calculate the 
variance inflation factors (VIFs) in order to test the 
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multicollinearity. All of the values were in the range from 1.08 to 
2.15, which is acceptable (Belsley et al., 1980).  
Table 2 provides the result of GLS regression analysis of 
my hypotheses. Model 1 shows the influence of the control 
variables on the number of the competitive action of firms. Firm 
scope (number of markets) was estimated as predicted. The more 
market the firm was competing in, the more competitive action 
initiated by the firm. On the other hand, the other two control 
variables; firm revenue and asset/liability turned out to be opposite 
of what we had expected. This was not consistent with previous 
studies (Hambrick, et al., 1996; Yu, et al., 2009; Cho and Hambrick, 
2006), in which firm slack resource and firm profit was positively 
related to competitive actions. One explanation is that between 
2006 and 2008 North American auto industry was in a downturn, 
especially the 3 biggest automakers in the United States: General 
Motors, Ford, and Chrysler. This might have resulted in an opposite 
correlation between slack resource and competitive actions. 
Model 2 tests the hypothesis 1, which is the baseline 
hypothesis. The result shows that competitive action is significant 
and it is negative coefficient for multimarket contact (β = -0.21, p 
< 0.005). As the multimarket contact increases, the competitive 
action of firms decreases. Thus supports Hypothesis 1. In model 3 
to 5, we examined each of the moderating variables, which are 
media coverage, alliance experience, link, and scale alliance. Model 
3 tests the moderating effect of media coverage on mutual 
forbearance (Hypothesis 2). Although the result showed that the 
more media coverage they have the stronger impact of mutual 
forbearance becomes, it was not significant. Model 4 shows the 
result of Hypothesis 3, which tests the effect of alliance experience 
on mutual forbearance. The interaction between multimarket 
contact and alliance experience is negative and significant (β = -
0.24, p < 0.001), supporting the argument that the effect of 
multimarket contact on competitive action between firms 













Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Firm scope  
(number of 
markets) 
0.09** 0.14*** 0.16*** 0.05* 0.14*** 
Slack resourcea 
(asset/liability) 
-0.02 -0.03 -0.01 -0.02 -0.12 
Total revenuea -0.05 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.03 
Multimarket contact  -0.21** -0.24** -0.11 -0.13* 
Media coverage   -0.11   
Alliance experience    1.42***  
Link alliance     2.41** 
Scale alliance     2.52*** 
Media coverage × 
Multimarket contact 




   -0.24***  
Link alliance × 
Multimarket contact 
    -0.38** 
Scale alliance ×
	Multimarket contact 
    -0.51*** 
Scale alliance × 
Link alliance 
    -1.05** 
Scale × Link × 
Multimarket contact 




-569.29 -568.22 -545.39 -569.36 
Chi-square 9.06** 20.10*** 22.42*** 76.29*** 66.27*** 
 
aLogarithm 
Note: * p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
 
Model 5 provides tests for the effect of link alliance and scale 
alliance. Both the interaction terms of link alliance and scale alliance 
was significant. Also, the interaction term of scale alliance was 
greater and more significant. But in order to confirm Hypothesis 4 it 
is necessary to test whether this difference is statistically 
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significant. So we tested the difference between the interaction 
terms of the link, and scale alliance. We defined “high-link” and 
“high-scale” to contain values of one standard deviation above 
mean value of each link and scale alliance, and “low-scale” and 
“low-link” to contain one standard deviation below the mean. 
Then we tested the difference between the slopes of 1. Link 
alliance was high, but scale alliance was low, and 2. Link alliance 
was low, but scale alliance was high. The test was significant and 
thus supported the Hypothesis 4, which predicted that the 
strengthening effect of alliance experience would be stronger in 








Chapter 5. Discussion and Conclusion 
 
In various studies, mutual forbearance has been confirmed 
both theoretically and empirically (Baum & Korn, 1999; Chen 1996; 
Gimeno & Woo, 1996; Young et al., 2000). Although there are some 
studies that examine the contingencies that affect mutual 
forbearance of firms (Golden and Ma, 2003; Yu et al., 2009), most 
of the recent studies focus on the implementation of the mutual 
forbearance strategy. These studies assume that the firms do not 
have any other motivation to mutually forbear or that they are 
aware of their rivals in the same level. In this study, we argue that 
firms might have other reasons to strongly pursue the mutual 
forbearance strategy. In order to examine the firm’s decision-
making process we used Chen’s (1996) AMC perspective that 
focus on the drivers of organization’s behavior. We used media 
coverage to examine the awareness side of the organization, used 
alliance experience to examine the motivation side of the 
organization and controlled the capability of each firm by slack 
resources. The Hypotheses were tested by analyzing the database 
of 201 competitive actions by 10 biggest automobile companies 
Coefficient Standard 
Error 
z p>z 95% Confidence 
Interval 
0.83 0.41 2.00 0.04 0.01 1.65 
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operating in the United States over 3 years of time. The result 
showed that the more alliance experience the firm has with its rival 
the stronger the impact of mutual forbearance becomes. Also, this 
effect will differ depending on which alliance the firm had 
experienced between link or scale alliance. The effect of alliance 
experience will be stronger in firms that experienced scale alliance 
than those firms that experienced link alliance. These results add to 
the literature of mutual forbearance that in some situations firms 
have more motive to initiate the mutual forbearance strategies and 
that the effect of the rivalry deterrence created by multimarket 
contact depends on the alliance experience between firms.  
The hypothesis 2, which tested the effect of media coverage 
on mutual forbearance was not significant. We assumed that in the 
organization’s decision-making process firms are heavily affected 
by the media, but this result show us that this effect might not be 
strong as we have assumed. The result might show that firms 
receive their information about their rivals from other sources than 
the media. Whereas the general public does not have much source 
other than the media to obtain information about the competition of 
firms, firms have a various source of information other than the 
media such as reports from their employees or outside sources 
such as consulting firms. But this does not mean that media has no 
effect on firm behavior. In this research, the firms selected were 10 
biggest automobile companies that are operating in U.S., so it might 
be possible that all of the firms are already much aware of each 
other. If the firms chosen were small firms that have less visibility, 
the result might be different.  
This study has several limitations that can be overcome in 
future studies. First the Automotive News was used not only as the 
source of competitive action, but also as the source of media 
coverage of firms. The result of the effect of media coverage would 
have been more robust if we used multiple sources of magazines, 
those reading material that managers tend to read (Business Week, 
or Fortune). Second although we used the awareness motivation 
capability perspective, we did not include the capability in the 
hypothesis and instead controlled it by slack resources. Future 
studies can include the perceived capability side of the AMC 
perspective in the hypothesis. For example using the CEO hubris 
literature we can argue that when the CEO has higher hubris, the 
capability of its rival might be perceived to be lower. Also being 
confident in their own company’s resource and capability, the firm 
will be less likely to implement the mutual forbearance strategy. 
Third, because of missing values, the time frame was limited from 
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2006 to 2008. Although this may not seriously affect the result of 
the analysis, more robustness is required to increase the time 
frame in the future study. Fourth, a business unit that the alliance 
was formed can affect the motivation of firms. Because for each 
company some business units are more important than others, an 
alliance concerning an important business unit will have a stronger 
effect on mutual forbearance strategy than an alliance concerning 
an insignificant business unit. For example in recent years Nissan 
has been concentrating on the hybrid and electric vehicles, thus 
alliance in these business units will be considered more important 
than alliance relating diesel engines.  
To conclude, by observing the behavioral drivers of the 
organization, this study provides new insight on the contingencies 
that affect the mutual forbearance strategy of firms. This study can 
be a floodgate to open up a new research stream about the effect of 
variables that can change organization’s behavior in the mutual 
forbearance strategy. The finding in this study also confirms that 
when the organization has more motivation to mutually forbear they 
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상 자  이 에 의하  기업들은 많은 시장을 유할수  
경쟁이 약 다고 한다. 이 논문에 는 AMC(awareness, motivation, 
capability) Perspective의 에  기업의 의식과 동기가 상 자  
략을 사 하도  결 하는  있어  향을 미치는지에 해 연 를 
하 다. 미 어 보도  휴 경험이 상 자 의 과에 향을 
미칠것이라고 가 하에 미 의 10가지 자동차 사를 중심으  
연 하 다.  
 
